



# SAFETY BULLETIN

## In-service failures of explosion-protected diesel engine systems

### BACKGROUND

Following a number of incident investigations and audits there appears to be inconsistency in incident notifications from underground coal operations with regards to the reporting of '*the in-service failures of the explosion-protection characteristics of explosion-protected plant*' on explosion-protected diesel engine systems.

### LEGISLATION

Clause 56 (1) (m) of the *Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006* requires notification to the Chief Inspector and the industry check inspector of any incident or matter involving the:

*'the in-service failure of the explosion-protection characteristics of explosion-protected plant,'*

This Safety Bulletin clarifies the above notification provision, in relation to explosion-protected diesel engine systems, to provide a consistent approach for all underground coal mines.

### ADVICE TO INDUSTRY

1. Explosion-protected diesel engine systems are assessed (for the purpose of registration) against the requirements of AS 3584.2:2003, '*Diesel engine systems for underground coal mines, Part 2: Explosion protected.*' The AS 3584.2 standard stipulates the explosion-protection characteristics and defines the components (characteristics) which form part of an explosion-protected diesel engine system.
2. All '*diesel engine systems used in underground mines at a coal workplace*' must be both design and item registered under Part 5.2 of the *OHS Regulation 2001* before use.
3. For the purpose of clarifying the above provisions, NSW DPI requires the following to be reported:  
*'Any incident or matter where it is evident an explosion-protected diesel engine system has been (or is likely to have previously been) operating in a **non-explosion-protected condition**.'*  
A **non-explosion-protected condition** means a condition which has potential to ignite either; coal dust on the surface of the engine; or methane in the surrounding atmosphere.
4. Examples of **matters which must be notified** include, (but are not limited to):
  - a) any explosion-protection characteristic failures when discovered during routine maintenance activities
  - b) the failure of a diesel engine system to shut down when required by the control sensors, for example, loss of water in the scrubber; excessive system temperature (above 150<sup>o</sup>C); failure of engine cooling system, etc
  - c) a catastrophic failure of the diesel engine system which protrudes external to the engine, such as turbochargers, superchargers, piston, valves, connecting rods, etc
  - d) the failure of a primary and back-up control sensor, for example temperature, floats, etc
  - e) the failure of an explosion-protected open joint which exceeds the specified dimensions for explosion protection
  - f) looseness of any explosion-protected fixed joint (gasket joint)
  - g) deterioration or significant damage to any dry type flame-trap

- h) the failure or loosening of any screw-type explosion-protection joint
  - i) the failure to replace any explosion-protected component, such as a cap, plug, flame-trap or other like component, after carrying out maintenance activities
  - j) any evidence of a fire or spark external to the explosion-protected joints, flame-trap or water conditioner
  - k) any catastrophic failure of a turbo in a dry-type exhaust system
  - l) failure of the cooling system, and/or sensors such that the external surface temperature of the diesel engine and/or exhaust gas temperature at the flame-traps appears to have exceeded 150<sup>o</sup>C
  - m) evidence of thermal degradation of an exhaust filter
  - n) the water level not being at or above the minimum safe water level when the diesel engine shuts down automatically.
5. Examples of **matters which are not required to be notified** include, (but are not limited to),:
- a) the failure of a single sensor where back-up sensors are installed, functional and the diesel engine system is not in a non-explosion-protected condition; for example:
    - (i) a single exhaust float failure where a back-up float is fitted and functional
    - (ii) a single temperature sensor failure where a back-up sensor is fitted and functional
  - b) the failure of an engine to start
  - c) stopping of the engine system because a sensor has operated
  - d) failure of the engine cooling system where the engine shuts down
  - e) any other failure which does not render the diesel engine system in an non-explosion-protected condition.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Underground coal mine managers and engineering managers should review their reporting/NSW DPI notification system for consistency with this Safety Bulletin.
2. Where safety-related failures have been identified, an internal audit system should be set up to review and identify safety improvements and provide feedback to the designer/manufacture.

**NOTE:** Please ensure all relevant people in your organisation receive a copy of this Safety Bulletin, and are informed of its content and recommendations. This Safety Bulletin should be processed in a systematic manner through the mine's information and communication process. It should also be placed on the mine's notice board.

**Signed**



**Rob Regan**  
**DIRECTOR**  
**MINE SAFETY OPERATIONS BRANCH**  
**NSW DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES**

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